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Abstract: Departing from the idea of díkē [justice], present in Homeric 
poetry and the different perspectives developed in the poems attributed 
to Hesiod, I highlight some of the significant adjustments of that concept 
made by Solon in his historical context. In my discussion, I read some of 
his political poems – mainly frs. 4 and 36 W.
2
 –, focusing on his allusions 
to writing. My purpose is to suggest new ways of comprehending díkē in 
Solon’s poetry to reclaim his importance in the Hellenic tradition of thinking 
about justice and writing.
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SÓLON ESCREVE DE VOLTA:
OUTRA LEITURA DE DÍKĒ NOS ANTIGOS POETAS HELÊNICOS
Resumo: Partindo da ideia de díkē [justiça] presente na poesia homérica e 
das diferentes perspectivas desenvolvidas nos poemas atribuídos a Hesíodo, 
buscamos destacar alguns dos significativos ajustes feitos por Sólon a esse 
conceito em seu próprio contexto histórico. Em nossa argumentação, lemos 
alguns de seus poemas políticos — principalmente os frs. 4 e 36 W.
2
 —, 
atentando para alusões à escrita. Nosso objetivo é sugerir novas formas 
de compreensão da díkē na poesia de Sólon, a fim de reivindicar sua im-
portância para a tradição helênica de pensamento sobre a justiça e a escrita.
Palavras-chave: Justiça; Sólon; Hesíodo; Homero; moralidade.
The importance of díkē to any treatment of ancient morality or jus-
tice is acutely demonstrated by the number of publications dedicated to 
that concept in the last century. From the basic works by German philolo-
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gists such as Hirzel (Themis, Dike und Verwandtes, 1907), Ehrenberg (Die 
Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum, 1921) and Jaeger (“Solons Eunomie”, 
1926) through the seminal considerations by Vlastos (“Solonian Justice”, 
1946), Gagarin (“Dikē in the Works and Days”, 1973) and Havelock (The 
Greek concept of Justice, 1978) and leading to the recent upheaval in So-
lonian studies, díkē is a fundamental idea in the poetics from the archaic 
period. In this brief paper, I survey some of the dimensions suggested by 
that concept in Homeric poetry and its different perspectives in the poems 
attributed to Hesiod, to highlight some of the significant adjustments made 
by Solon to his historical context. My main objective is to suggest that 
some characteristics of writing – as perceived by Solon and his public in 
ancient Athens – influenced the poet’s view of díkē at the end of the archaic 
period. I attempt to avoid the problem of authorship in Homer and Hesiod, 
assuming that Solon, on the other hand, was a historical figure who actu-
ally lived in Athens (from roughly the last third of the 7
th
 century BC to the 




Firstly, it is interesting to remember the most commonly accepted ety-
mologies and senses of díkē, derived from the root *deik-: a) “sign, mark, 
characteristic”, meaning also “characteristic, traditional, proper behavior”; 
b) “boundary, dividing line”, also implying “‘settlement or decision’ between 
two contestants, that is, placing a ‘boundary line’ (straight or crooked) be-
tween them” (GAGARIN, 1973, p. 82). The etymological explanations given 
by Chantraine (1951, p. 284) basically follow that same direction, suggesting 
a certain relation between díkē [justice] and the verb deíknumi [to point] as 
a manifest designation by an authority, in addition to the importance of the 
oral manifestation in a verbal sentence given by such an authority (as in the 
etymologically related Latin verb dicō). An association with the verb dikeîn 
[to throw] has already been suggested, but rejected (CHANTRAINE, 1951, 
p. 282), and it seems that some word play could exist among díkē, *dékhomai 
[to take, to accept, to receive] and dokéō [to seem].
These associations are clear in the excerpts of the Iliad most quoted in 
critical approaches to the theme of justice theme – so it is the case in the 
ékphrasis of Achilles’ shield made by Hephaistos, in which the following 
words are applied to the description of a city depicted on the heavy shield:
In the meeting-place a crowd of citizens had formed;
a dispute had arisen there, and two men were quarreling
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over the blood-money of a man who had been killed.
One claimed [eúkheto] he had paid it in full, appealing to the people,
while the other said he had received nothing; both were anxious
to go to an arbitrator [epí hístori] for judgement [peîrar]. The people 
took sides,
shouting support for both; heralds were holding them back,
while the elders sat on polished stones in a sacred circle,
holding in their hands the loud-voiced [hēerophṓnōn] heralds’ staffs.
The disputants rushed up to these men, and they gave their judge-
ments [díkazon]
in turn; two talents of gold lay before them, to be given to
the judge who should deliver to them the straightest verdict [díkēn 
ithýntata eípoi]. 
(HOMER. Iliad XVIII, vv. 497-508, transl. Anthony Verity)
The legal procedures suggested in this excerpt include the importance 
of the voice, not only in the giving of sentences and verdicts, but also in the 
litigants’ claims and oaths, as the verb eúkhomai seems to imply. Addition-
ally, the excerpt reveals the symbolic valor of signaling, indicating, and 
pointing (as the “loud-voiced heralds’ staffs” suggest). According to Have-
lock’s (1978, p. 136) comments on this passage: “This kind of justice is not 
a set of preexistent principles or a set of rulings imposed by judges in the 
light of such principles. It is a symbol, or a process achieved through oral 
persuasion and oral conviction”. Should other passages of the Iliad be cited 
here, the same pattern would reveal its connections to Iliadic instances of 
justice and judicial settlements.
2
Also considering the Odyssey, it is possible to establish a series of fur-
ther reflections and comparisons. The most important scenes of judicial 
debates occur in both Homeric poems during public assemblies, in which 
some characteristics are commonly identifiable, even if some differences 
also can be observed from one poem to the other:
Formally speaking, the agora’s role in both poems is identical. It 
is to provide a forum which will (1) listen to the terms of a dispute 
as these are made the subject of harangue by contending parties 
and (2) attest as listeners statements made on oath by either party, 
attestations in which the gods are to be included. In the Iliad the 
agora also performs the function of witnessing an agreement finally 
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achieved with attestation of the terms of the agreement. In the Odys-
sey this function will be denied it. (HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 143)
Such a difference in the role performed by public assemblies in each 
poem can be related to another consensually accepted distinction between 
them: the Odyssey presents a moral polarization of its characters – the suit-
ors are not just enemies, but they are also labeled with formulas that are 
morally pejorative –, while there is nothing of the sort in the Iliad (HAVE-
LOCK, 1978, p. 151). One might argue that, even within the shame culture 
depicted through the conflicts on the plains of Troy, as is mainly the case 
in Hellenic society, according to Dodds (1951, p. 28-50), there are some 
moral elements that allow men to believe some things are right and others 
wrong (DICKIE, 1978, p. 93). I do not see any reason to deny that Homeric 
poems employ díkē in a moral sense: in my opinion, the concept in its legal 
and judicial dimensions has unavoidable moral implications.
3
 In addition 
to the moral standards in both poems, the Odyssey presents Odysseus’s 
enemies as wrongdoers, offering a final ordeal as an extralegal solution to 
the moral offenses inflicted by them. Even if the same associations of díkē 
could be established with the importance of vocal commands and explicit 
determinations based on social authority, the Odyssey develops a certain 
suspicion towards the effectiveness of such a process for settling quarrels. 
In the words of Havelock:
The story of the Iliad makes perceptible a “justice” operating as a 
method for resolving disputes or as a symbol for such a method; it 
replaces physical conflict by a form of negotiation under the aegis 
of a popular assembly. There is no such “justice” operative in the 
Odyssey. The main action is extralegal; that is the way the story is 
told. (HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 148)
Hesiod develops these tendencies from the Homeric poems even fur-
ther, pushing them into paradoxes and paroxysms. If, on the one hand, he 
personifies and deifies Díkē, expanding its meaning to a more general and 
abstract sense (GAGARIN, 1973, p. 89), on the other, he deepens suspi-
cions towards the effectiveness of traditional legal procedures. These de-
velopments seem paradoxical, but they are part of the Hesiodic arrange-
ment for the entire set of his poetic compositions, including not only the 
Theogony but also Works and days.
4
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In his poem about the genesis of the Olympian gods and the power of 
Zeus, Hesiod focuses on the divine order of the existence, presenting Díkē 
as Zeus’s daughter:
Second, he [Zeus] married bright Themis, who gave birth to the 
Horae (Seasons), Eunomia (Lawfulness) and Dike (Justice) and 
blooming Eirene (Peace), who care for the works of mortal human 
beings, and the Destinies, upon whom the counsellor Zeus bestowed 
the greatest honor, Clotho and Lachesis and Atropos, who give 
the mortal human beings both good and evil to have. (HESIOD. 
Theogony, vv. 901-906, transl. Glenn Most)
In Hesiod’s other poem, about the human condition, the word díkē in-
troduces a range of more diverse and paradoxical meanings, which might 
reflect a more diverse and paradoxical human existence.
5
 Only by consider-
ing such a complexity it is possible to comprehend the traditionalism and 
innovations in Hesiodic poetry. Among the intertextual features of díkē, 
famously restated by him, it is possible to highlight: its opposition to force 
[bíē] and violence [hýbris]; its connection to the swearing of oaths; its de-
pendence upon kingship; its strong relationship with Zeus (probably aris-
ing from links between díkē, kings, and the king of the gods) (GAGARIN, 
1973, p. 90-91).
6
 On the other hand, such an innovativeness in his poetic 
conception of díkē can be fully appreciated in the following excerpt, in 
which Hesiod is exhorting his brother, Perses, to pursue a just life:
As for you, Perses, give heed to Justice [Díkēs] and do not foster 
Outrageousness [Hýbrin]. For Outrageousness is evil in a worth-
less mortal; and even a fine man cannot bear her easily, but en-
counters calamities and then is weighed down under her. The bet-
ter road is the one towards what is just [es tà díkaia], passing her 
by on the other side. Justice [Díkē] wins out over Outrageousness 
when she arrives at the end; but the fool only knows this after he 
has suffered. For at once Oath starts to run along beside crooked 
judgments [skoliēisi díkēisin], and there is a clamor when Justice 
[Díkēs] is dragged where men, gift-eaters [dōrophágoi], carry her 
off and pronounce verdicts [thémistas] with crooked judgments 
[skoliēis dè díkēis]; but she stays, weeping, with the city and the 
people’s abodes, clad in invisibility, bearing evil to the human be-
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ings who drive her out and do not deal straight. (HESIOD. Works 
and days, vv. 213-225, transl. Glenn Most)
As it has been noted for long, díkē in this excerpt can mean both “legal 
process”, mainly as it appears in the divinized form, and “penalty for the 
violation of legal process” (which surely becomes part of the legal process 
itself) (GAGARIN, 1973, p. 92). However, the most interesting aspect of 
that excerpt is the tension between the divine and more abstract concept of 
Díkē [Justice] – something that does not seem entirely devoid of a moral 
sense (DICKIE, 1973, p. 99) – and the human and more concrete concept 
of díkai [judgments]. It is as if Hesiod were starting to suspect that the 
majority of the díkai were uttered by gift-eaters, i.e. the kings [basileîs] 
richly paid to do so; therefore, it could not effectively be a manifestation 
of Díkē upon the earth. Even if the poet considers the possibility of direct 
judgments [díkas itheías] pronounced by just people (Works and days, vv. 
225-237), he advises against the evil that most people accomplishes with-
out understanding its negative consequences upon themselves.
But to those who care only for evil outrageousness and cruel 
deeds, far-seeing Zeus, Cronus’ son, marks out justice [díkēn].
7
 
Often even a whole city suffers because of an evil man who sins 
and devises wicked deeds. Upon them, Cronus’ son brings forth 
woe from the sky, famine together with pestilence, and the people 
die away; the women do not give birth, and the households are 
diminished by the plans of the Olympian Zeus. And at another time 
Cronus’ son destroys their broad army or their wall, or he takes 
vengeance upon their ships on the sea. (HESIOD. Works and days, 
vv. 238-247, transl. Glenn Most)
It should be noted that the tension between a more traditional idea of 
Zeus (as the guarantor of Díkē) and punishment for improper behavior (as 
another meaning of díkē) is expressly built by Hesiod in these verses. Some 
scholars, like Gagarin (1973, p. 92-93), suggested that such a tension would 
occur due to Hesiod’s lack of a sufficiently developed specialized vocabu-
lary, but I would rather understand it as deliberate work on the paradoxes 
of human language and existence upon the earth, to sketch his realistic (or 
even pessimistic) Weltanschauung. That tension reaches its paroxysm in 
the next session of his poem, in which the divine form of Díkē, guarded by 
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Zeus, seems totally absent from his contemporary reality. Hesiod begins 
this excerpt with an admonition, asserting the unjust aspects of his own 
times and concluding with an ominous remark.
As for you kings, too, ponder this justice [tḗnde díkēn] yourselves. 
For among human beings there are immortals nearby, who take 
notice of all those who grind one another down with crooked 
judgments [skoliêisi díkēisin] and have no care for the gods’ ret-
ribution [ópin]. Thrice ten thousand are Zeus’ immortal guard-
ians of mortal human beings upon the bounteous earth, and they 
watch over judgments and cruel deeds [hoí rha phylássousín te 
díkas kai skhétlia érga], clad in invisibility, walking everywhere 
upon the earth. There is a maiden, Justice [Díkē], born of Zeus, 
celebrated and revered by the gods who dwell on Olympus, and 
whenever someone harms her by crookedly scorning her, she sits 
down at once beside her father Zeus, Cronus’ son, and proclaims 
the unjust mind [ádikon nóon] of human beings, so that he will 
take vengeance upon the people for the wickedness of their kings, 
who think baneful thought and bend judgements to one side by 
pronouncing them crookedly [díkas skoliôs enépontes]. Bear this 
in mind, kings, and straighten your discourses [ithýnete mýthous], 
you gift-eaters, and put crooked judgments [skoliôn dè dikéōn] 
quite out of your minds. A man contrives evil for himself when he 
contrives evil for someone else, and an evil plan is most evil for 
the planner. Zeus’ eye, which sees all things and knows all things, 
perceives this too, if he so wishes, and he is well aware of just what 
kind of justice [hoíēn dḕ kaì tḗnde díkēn] this is which the city 
has within it. Right now I myself would not want to be a just man 
among human beings [autòs en anthrṓpoisi díkaios], neither I nor 
a son of mine, since it is evil for a man to be just [epeì kakòn án-
dra díkaion] if the more unjust one will receive greater justice [ei 
meízōge díkēn adikṓteros éxein]. But I do not anticipate that the 
counsellor Zeus will let things end up this way. (HESIOD. Works 
and days, vv. 248-273, transl. Glenn Most)
Hesiod only utters the paradox that the more unjust man receives great-
er justice than the just one, because he is playing upon two meanings of the 
word díkē.
8
 This is proposed in the passage after the reassertion of Díke’s 
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divine ascendancy and transcendental protection, which highlighted the 
gravity of the kings’ faults (such as uttering crooked discourses and judg-
ments). It is clear that Hesiod develops in these verses a deeper suspicion 
against earthly methods of asserting díkē: the kings may be the ministers 
of Zeus’s justice upon the earth (as it is said in Theogony 80-92), but their 
procedures of gift-eating have led their discourses and judgments astray, 
misleading them towards a crooked path that corrupted the city to the point 
in which being a just man became an evil.
Hesiod denounces the distance that lies between Zeus (the last bastion 
of justice), his daughter, Díkē [Justice], the earthly kings [basileîs] and their 
judgments [díkai]. That attitude would be a distinctive feature of Hesiodic 
poetry, a critical opposition to aristocratic control of justice mechanisms 
(GLOTZ, 1904, p. 239-243; SVENBRO, 1981, p. 60-66; IRWIN, 2005, p. 
157-158). However, if the possibility of an effective critique did not exist 
for Hesiod and his public in Boeotia, it did become a reality when another 
moralist poet came to power in the beginning of the 6
th 
century in Athens.
Solon is as earnest a moralist as Hesiod. But instead of turning 
loose upon his audience the traditional repertoire of superstitious 
terrors, he makes them look at history, considering cause and ef-
fect. There is no evidence that he thinks of a concept of social cau-
sality; but he certainly thinks with one. (VLASTOS, 1946, p. 66)
This comparison between Solonian poetry and the Hesiodic legacy is a 
common approach in modern scholarship.
9
 In my comments, I would like to 
suggest that Solon radicalizes Hesiod’s suspicion towards the unsurmountable 
distance between Zeus and human sentences, i.e. between Díkē and díkai, de-
parting from the same kind of diagnosis from roughly similar historical situa-
tions — but proposing a further prognosis in order to deal with them.
10
 
Amongst Solon’s depictions of important Hesiodic themes, the follow-
ing verses are commonly recalled as an important moment of their dialogue.
But it is the citizens themselves who in their senselessness are will-
ing to destroy a great city, persuaded by money; and the mind of 
the leaders of the people is unjust, and they are certain to suffer 
much grief from their great hybris. [...]
These evils redound upon the citizen body: but many of the poor 
arrive in foreign lands, having been sold and bound in unseemly 
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chains. In this way does a public ill come to the home of each, and 
the courtyard doors refuse any longer to hold it back, and it leaps 
over the high wall, and it surely finds him, even if he flees into the 
innermost recess of his room. (SOLON. 4 W.
2
 5-8; 23-29, transl. 
Elizabeth Irwin)
This is mainly the same moral doctrine as the one presented by Hes-
iod in a passage previously quoted from Works and days,
11
 even Solon’s 
remarks have overtones of a more communal dimension. In any case, that 
moral inclination seems to be linked to a didactic impulse behind both po-
etic works.
12
 Furthermore, one can observe that,
[n]early all of the themes of Solon 4 appear in Hesiod’s poetry, pri-
marily in the Works and Days, but also the Theogony. Solon 4 is 
characterised by the same nexus of thought that pervades the Works 
and Days. The excesses of leaders, the instrumentality of greed in 
the creation of injustice and communal suffering, the detailed focus 
on δίκη and the consequences for the city of its behaviour towards 
δίκη are dominant themes in both texts [...]. (IRWIN, 2005, p. 159)
However, I should also note the differences between the conceptions 
by both poets as subjacent to such obvious resemblances: Solon dismisses 
divine intervention as one of the possible reasons for the destruction of the 
pólis;
13
 Zeus is not depicted as the ultimate bastion of Justice,
14
 while Jus-
tice appears acting by itself in a rather distinctive way.
They
15
 grow rich relying on their unjust deeds [adíkois érgmasi] 
... Sparing nothing of sacred nor public property they steal, pil-
laging from one another, and they do not watch over the sol-
emn foundations of Justice [oudè phulássontai semnà Díkēs thé-
methla], who in silence bears witness to both the things taking 
place and those that were before [hḕ sigôsa súnoide tà gignó-
mena pró t’eónta], and in time does certainly come exacting ret-
ribution [tôi dè khrónōi pántōs ḗlth’ apoteisoménē]. (SOLON. 4 
W.
2
 11-16, transl. Elizabeth Irwin)
If the subject of the evil deeds represented in these verses focuses on the 
dḗmou hēgemónes [leaders of the people], there is a assumption that they 
would be responsible for watching over the solemn foundations of Justice 
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[semnà Díkēs thémethla] and that, because of their negligence, Justice it-
self must exact retribution in due time, bearing witness in silence to the 
events taking place and the ones that preceded them. The differences from 
the Hesiodic report on retribution for abuses of Justice are symptomatic 
and may reveal what lies behind the following expressions: semnà Díkēs 
thémethla [solemn foundations of Justice], sigôsa [in silence], súnoide 
[bears witness] and tôi khrónōi [in time]. On the main differences between 
Hesiod and Solon, one might note that,
Solon seems to avoid the elements of vulnerability present in 
Hesiod’s depiction of Δίκη. While the silence of Solon’s Δίκη may be 
ambiguous (σιγῶσα, ‘in silence’), she does not cry like Hesiod’s mai-
den. In fact her silence contrasts with both descriptions of Hesiod’s 
justice for whom there is a ῥόθος (‘clamour’) when she is dragged 
away and who complains to her father (γηρύετό ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον 
νόον, ‘she tells of unjust mind of men’, 260) when she is wronged. 
Moreover, Hesiod’s justice flits about, shrouded in mist, whereas 
Solon’s Δίκη has rather permanent-sounding σεμνὰ θέμεθλα (‘au-
gust foundations’). Further still Solon’s Δίκη does not seem to need 
Zeus: she can herself exact τίσις (‘requital’). (IRWIN, 2005, p. 174)
My suggestion for the main reason of differences underlying these ac-
counts about Díkē is that they relate to a substantial distinction in medium: 
while Hesiod depicts an oral justice, based on the divine power of oral formulas 
applied to sentences [díkai], Solon deals with the written dimension of justice 
based on the application of laws [thesmoí] fixed by writing. It is commonly 
acknowledged that some of Solon’s innovativeness is due to the application of 
writing to his poetry and sociopolitical work (e.g. THOMAS, 1992, p. 66-71), 
as he explains it himself in some of his poems and as the main ancient sources 
on biographical tradition about him mention explicitly. However, most modern 
scholarship does not seem to have recognized the implications of a “gramma-
tological conscience” in Solon’s thought for his conception of Díkē.
In a poem quoted in chapter 12 of Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia to 
document certain aspects of his political career, Solon — talking about the 
liberation of the earth and the Athenian slaves — suggests that,
[t]hese things with strength [krátei], combining force and justice [bíēn 
te kaì díkēn xunarmósas], I accomplished, and I carried out my promises. 
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I wrote [égrapsa] laws [thesmoùs] for the bad/lowly and the good/noble 
man equally, fitting straight justice to each [eutheîan eis hékaston harmó-
sas díkēn]. (SOLON 36 W.
2
 15-20, transl. Elizabeth Irwin)
Beyond the tyrannical traces in these verses (including other excerpts 
of Solonian poetry), as correctly stressed by Irwin (2005, p. 205-261),
16
 
it should be noted that a strong relationship is suggested between writing 
laws and fitting direct justice. The reiteration of the radical *ar- (present in 
the verbs xunarmózō [to combine] and harmózō [to fit]) in relation to dif-
ferent instances of díkē [justice] advances the idea of a material dimension 
for the effective adjustment of justice within his poetry.
17
 Such a material 
dimension, I suggest, is intrinsic to his writing of the laws [thesmoí].
In that sense, my idea is that Solon observes the same kind of problem 
previously described by Hesiod: the noble men responsible for tentative 
maintenance upon the earth of Díkē [Justice] had been harming it through 
their crooked díkai [judgments].
18
 The distance between a transcendent guar-
antee of Díkē [Justice] and its manifestations in human existence, in the oral 
utterances of díkai [judgments], seemed too great to be surmounted; how-
ever, while Hesiod’s attitude varies from pessimistic submission to an ex-
pression of faith in the ultimate power of Zeus to an attempt of admonishing 
powerful people to act with fairness, Solon tried to deal more consciously 
with that inaccessible transcendence of guaranteeing Díkē. Solon founded 
in his own writing a material dimension that might fundament the imma-
nent righteousness of Justice and, as such, a matter of “common” or “public” 
truth. His strategy opened some areas of power to new classes of people and 
affected the aristocratic prerogative of applying justice by widening it.
19
This movement had already been properly described by Nicole Loraux 
(1988, p. 124) in her excellent essay on the tensions between oral traditions 
and written poetry in Solon’s work. The effectiveness of Solon’s prognosis 
depended on other points from his political reforms; and even if he did not 
execute a radical reformation, as some people would have wished, the overall 
sketch of his program was rather progressive.
20
 This characteristic is linked to 
the revolutionary impact that writing seems to have had in the archaic period 
(an aspect that I can only allude to in this brief paper).
21
 Regardless, now that 
I have delineated the main lines of my argument, it is possible to suggest what 
lies behind the expressions of semnà Díkēs thémethla [solemn foundations of 
Justice], sigôsa [in silence], súnoide [bears witness] and tôi khrónōi [in time].
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The word thémethla [foundations] refers to the spatialization of oral 
power when an inscriptional device is projected and laid down in a public 
space with evident architectonic implications. It is not a coincidence that 
the word — thémethla — has the same etymology of the verb títhemi [to 
set] and the substantive form thesmoí [laws] (LORAUX, 1988, p. 116).
22
 
They suggest a spatial monumentality required to fundament the new Díkē 
as conceived by Solon in Athenian law.
Another characteristic of that written monumentality of Díkē is that it 
can bear witness in silence. As public inscriptions of the laws are visible to 
everyone in the public space and readable by every literate citizen, this Díkē 
is said to bear witness [súnoide] – with all legal implications of such a vo-
cabulary – in silence [sigôsa]. It does not need to evoke a clamor [rhóthos], 
to weep [klaíousa], or even sit down beside father Zeus, proclaiming the 
unjust mind of human beings [pár Diì patrì kathezoménē Kroníōni/ gērúet’ 
anthrṓpōn ádikon nóon], as Hesiod had previously said about it (Works and 
days 220-224; 260). Justice stands visibly and silently, bearing witness of the 
past and of the present to exact future retribution;
23
 the pragmatic dimension 
of Díkē’s activities may be one of the reasons for the specificity found in the 
Solonian conception (NOUSSIA-FANTUZZI, 2010, p. 241). 
Finally, the expression tôi khrónōi [in time] refers to the temporal-
ization necessary for the manifestation of Díkē through due examination 
of written laws in specific legal processes, in effective public judgments 
[díkai]. It comes as no surprise that Solon, in other political poems, alludes 
to the importance of time in the effectiveness of just work. Such is the case 








 The poet seems conscious 
that an inevitable distance – in space and time – lies between a transcendent 
idea (for a divinized Díkē) and any of its earthly manifestations (for díkai 
[judgments]). Founding his conception of Díkē on an earthly institution 
that recreates and reserves that inevitable distance was Solon’s way of deal-
ing with a great political problem.
26
 As noted by a scholar,
[t]his regular movement of time as the enactment of balance and justice, 
as natural law, is an idea that we can observe simultaneously take shape in 
Asia Minor during the same period; notably and most famously in Anaxi-
mander, of course [Anaximander 1 DK (= Simplicius in Phys. 24, 17)]. 
Both can be seen, in part, as an imposition on the world of the spirit of the 
written law codes that were, at this time, first being set in wood and stone 
throughout the cities of the Greek world. (GAGNÉ, 2009, p. 37) 
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It could be argued that one of the main points in Solon’s political 
agenda, i.e. his conception of Eunomia, contains genuine and undeniable 
links to his view of Díkē and its material dimensions in the written law, 
as discussed throughout this paper.
27
 I will not develop this interpretation 
much further, but it seems important to stress the following points: Solon 
mentions something that can be taught (as the verb didáxai indicates); the 
things put in order are said to be materially fit (as suggested by the reitera-
tion of the radical *ar-, in the two mentions of the word ártia); the crooked 
judgments [díkai] are said to have been straightened (with the employment 
of the verb euthúnō), as said about the result of writing laws [égrapsa ... 
thesmoús] (in fr. 36 W.
2
). These are the final verses of his famous fr. 4 W.
2
:
This is what my heart bids me teach [didáxai] the Athenians: Dysnomia 
furnishes the most ills for the city, but Eunomia makes all things [pánt’ 
apophaínei] well ordered and fit [eúkosma kaì ártia], and often it shackles 
the feet of the unjust. It smooths the rough, puts an end to excess, dimin-
ishes hybris, causes to wither the growing flowers of ruinous behaviour. 
It straightens crooked judgements [euthúnei dè díkas skoliás], and makes 
gentle overweening acts. It stops the works of discord, and brings to an end 
the anger of grievous strife; under its guidance all things among men are 
both fitting and in proper accord [pánta kat’ anthrṓpous ártia kaì pinutá]. 
(SOLON 4 W.
2
 30-39, transl. Elizabeth Irwin, adapted)
I attempted to delineate new dimensions of the Solonian Díkē in con-
trast to what had already been suggested by the main poets of the hexamet-
rical tradition in the archaic period (Homer and Hesiod).
28
 In my analysis, 
I read some of Solon’s political poems, mainly frs. 4 W.
2
 and 36 W.
2
, as 
they contain Solon’s basic views of díkē, adopting a strategy of considering 
his poetical allusions to technological developments such as writing in his 
interactions with sociopolitical institutions. 
Even though that approach has been common in recent scholarship 
since the works by Nicole Loraux (1989) and Fabienne Blaise (1995), my 
results differ from those in important aspects: I defend not only that writ-
ing had a profound impact on the way Solon conceived justice in his own 
terms, but also that the poet dealt with it as an important object of his 
reflections. Although previous studies might have suggested some points 
of that thesis, they did not explicitly defend that some characteristics of 
writing, such as materiality, durability, visibility and publicity, influenced 
Solon’s view of justice. My main point, therefore, is to provide new ways 
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of comprehending Solonian Díkē through new readings of his poetry, with 
its complex intra- and intertextual allusions, and to highlight Solon’s posi-
tion as one of the main figures in the Hellenic tradition of Western thought.
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 The question has been well summed up by Almeida (2003, p. 1-69). Lefkowitz 
(2012) offers a critical approach to the biographical tradition of the poets. Some 
problems of authorship and authority in the context of sympotic poetry (as in the 
case of Solon’s poetry) are addressed by Irwin (2005, p. 32-3).
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2
 In his treatment of the theme, Havelock (1978) deals with the first quarrel between 
Achilles and Agamemnon, in the beginning of the Iliad (p. 129-130), the prepara-
tions for the embassy in the book IX (p. 130-131), Agamemnon’s apology in the 
book XIX and Menelaus asking for justice in the chariot race of the book XXIII (p. 
133-135), besides the passage previously quoted, of the book XVIII (p. 135-137). 
Some of those passages are also analyzed, through a somewhat different perspecti-
ve, by Gagarin (1973, p. 83-87).
3
 For a substantial argumentation in this direction, cf. Dickie (1978, p. 91-101). 
Contra: Gagarin (1973, p. 87); Havelock (1978, p. 192).
4
 Jenny Strauss Clay (2003) has suggested this approach as a way of understanding 
the complexities of Hesiod’s poetical corpus.
5
 This idea was developed by Clay (2003, p. 6-8) in her interpretation of Hesiod’s 
considerations about Éris [Strife], from the divine perspective (in the Theogony) 
and the human one (in the Works and days). 
6
 Even asserting Hesiod’s traditionalism, I disagree with Havelock’s “homero-cen-
tric” reading of the Works and days (HAVELOCK, 1978, p. 193-217). For a critique 
of this approach, cf. Almeida (2003, p. 182-184).
7
 Here, the sense of dikē could also be “punishment” (GAGARIN, 1973, p. 92).
8
 This may be the easiest argument against Rodger’s (1971, p. 289-301) case for 
a “Protagorean” sense of justice in Homer, Hesiod and other archaic and classical 
authors. Rodger says that, until Plato, díkē is that which avoids disaster and that 
díkaios is the man who succeeds well. Against this interpretation of díkē, cf. Dickie 
(1973, p. 100-101).  
9
 Cf. Vlastos (1946, p. 66); Gagarin (1974, p. 190-192); Havelock (1978, p. 249-
262); Irwin (2005, p. 155-198); Blaise (2006, p. 114-133). The restrictive character 
of some of the studies that overstate Solon’s “dependence” upon Hesiodic poetry is 
contested by Fabienne Blaise (1995, p. 25, n. 7; 2006, p. 120, n. 21).
10
 To a recent overview of the historical background of this poetical production, cf. 
Almeida (2003, p. 119-174, especially p. 159-170).
11
 “A man contrives evil for himself when he contrives evil for someone else, and an 
evil plan is most evil for the planner” (Works and days 265-266, transl. Glenn Most).
12
 Hesiod’s exhortations to his brother Perses, in the Works and days, have already 
been partially quoted. In Solon’s case, there is this important verse, for example: 
“These things does my heart bid me to teach the Athenians ...” (SOLON 4 W.
2
 30, 
transl. Elizabeth Irwin). 
13
 That is clear in the opening lines of Solon’s poem: “Our city will never perish by 
the dispensation of Zeus or the intentions of the blessed gods, who are immortal. 
For such a stout-hearted guardian, daughter of a mighty father, Pallas Athena, holds 
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her hands over it in protection.” (SOLON 4 W.
2
, transl. Elizabeth Irwin). I do not 
agree with Fabienne Blaise (2006, p. 125-127), when she suggests that these verses 
assert that the “city will never perish” tout court, because the poet says that the “city 
will never perish by the dispensation of Zeus or the intentions of the blessed gods”. 
In other words, no external enemy will destroy the city, but internal strife may be 
able to do so (IRWIN, 2005, p. 98-100).
14
 That is to say, not in Solon 4 W.
2
, because in another poem this is precisely his 
role: “allà Zeùs pántōn ephorâi télos [...]”; “toiaútē Zēnòs péletai tísis” (SOLON 
13 W.
2
 17; 25). I would say, in regard to Solon’s conception of Justice in this poem, 
that his remarks are not a series of contradictions paratactically juxtaposed, but a 
complementary addition to his own idea of Justice that is neither contradictory to 
the rest of his poetic corpus, nor self-contradictory, as some scholars suggest (for 
bibliography, cf. STODDARD, 2002, p. 149-152). With this complementary view 
of Justice, Solon explains the cases in which no immanent just effectiveness would 
have seemed to be displayed: how could one understand the suffering of innocent 
people or the absence of punishment for the unjust ones? In such cases, no Justice 
would have seemed to be at work. So the poet developed a complementary view of 
Justice — being aided by Zeus’s supervision — to certificate that no unjust person 
avoid punishment, even if this punishment is delayed in one, two or three gene-
rations before hitting the unjust génos (and, in the process, punishes an innocent 
member of such a génos). This more general conception of Justice, although highly 
outlandish from a modern individualistic perspective, has the virtue of enlightening 
areas of apparently incomprehensible situations in human existence, employing 
a common feature of archaic moral-religious beliefs (cf. GLOTZ, 1904, p. 168-
9, contra GAGNÉ, 2009, p. 43-44). Even if I do not totally agree with Fabienne 
Blaise’s arguments, her complementary reading of Solon 4 and 13 W.
2
 is a very 
interesting one (BLAISE, 2005).
15
 The subject of the verb is probably the dḗmou hēgemónes [leaders of the people], 
unless the lacuna in the fragmentary poem hides a change of subject.
16
 Blaise (1995, p. 35) suggests that such traces — characteristic of an isolated 
position — are in part due to Solon’s difficulty in finding an immanent foundation 
to his laws.
17
 Blaise (1995, p. 27) calls attention to that symmetry and suggests that Solon’s 
action and writing of laws were parallel movements within his political project. Cf. 
also: Loraux (1988, p. 123-124).
18
 The distinctions from díkai [judgments] to Díkē [Justice] ought to be constantly 
bore in mind (cf.: BLAISE, 1995, p. 30; ALMEIDA, 2003, p. 196-197).
19
 Although I would rather modulate the radicalism with which Solon’s achieve-
ments are described by Vlastos (1946, p. 83), I am in general agreement with his 
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concluding remarks about the Solonian justice. Blaise (1995, p. 30) suggests some-
thing in this same sense, while pointing to the importance of writing.
20
 For a recent overview about these aspects of Solon’s work, through a reading of 
the main sources to the biographical traditions about him (i.e. Aristotle’s Athenaion 
Politeia and Plutarch’s Life of Solon), cf. Almeida (2003, p. 8-19).
21
 For further remarks upon this revolutionary impact (cf. DETIENNE, 1989; THO-
MAS, 1992).
22
 Other interesting remarks are made by Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010, p. 239).
23
 However, I cannot agree with neither of Irwin’s suggestions that: a) “knowledge 
of the future is implicit in Dike’s very workings” (IRWIN, 2005, p. 177, n. 59), 
because in my opinion Solonian Díkē has rather a possibility of performing upon 
future events; b) the silence of Solon’s Justice may be linked to silent diseases of 
Pandora’s myth, as it is said in Works and days 104 (IRWIN, 2005, p. 181, n. 71). 
I also disagree with Almeida’s interpretation about this same passage (ALMEIDA, 
2003, p. 212-214).
24
 Transl. Joseph Almeida adapted: “Before achieving what of those things on ac-
count of which I gathered the demos, did I stop? The dark Earth, the most excellent 
mother of the Olympian gods would give witness in the dike of Time that I removed 
the disseminated horoi from her, which was enslaved, but is now free”.
25
 Transl. Gerber (apud GAGNÉ, 2009, p. 24): “Such is the vengeance of Zeus. He 
is not, like a mortal man, quick to anger at every deed. But one who has a sinful 
heart never escapes the notice of Zeus, for in the end, without fail, he is revealed. 
One man pays his due at once, another later. And those who themselves flee and 
escape the pursuing destiny from the gods, for them vengeance always comes at 
some other time, without fail: then the innocent pay the penalty – either the children 
of the guilty, or later progeny”.
26 For a somewhat different reading of the role of time in Solon’s political project 
– considering the importance of Gê [Earth] – (cf. BLAISE, 1995, p. 32; p. 36-37.
27 Even if Almeida’s overall approach to Solon’s Díkē tended to overstate its poli-
tical aspects – at the expenses of the juridical ones –, some of his own conclusions 
correct the one-sidedness of his main approach and tend to coincide with my sug-
gestions here (cf. ALMEIDA, 2003, p. 231.
28 With this affirmation I expressly contradict some of the main scholars that had 
guided my researches throughout those questions, as Gagarin (1974, p. 190, n. 33) 
and Havelock (1978, p. 262). I also disagree with Almeida’s highly “dis-juridici-
zed” main interpretation of Solon’s Díkē (ALMEIDA, 2003, p. 204-206).
